Convexity and Risk (based on Cerreia–Vioglio (2009) and Cerreia–Vioglio, Dillenberger, and Ortoleva (2013))

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Preferences under Risk

- We consider a Decision Maker, DM, who has preferences over probability distributions
- Why probability distributions?
- In Economics and Finance, probability distributions are used to model: value of an asset, value of an investment, behavior of an opponent, mixed strategies

Formalization of the Decision Framework

- Probability distributions?
- C is a set of consequences which is a subset of a compact metric space
- Δ is the set of all Borel probability measures over C
- ► Elements of ∆ are denoted by p, q, r ∈ ∆ and they are called lotteries

Examples

- C is a finite set. Δ can be identified with the simplex of $\mathbb{R}^{|C|}$
- C is a bounded and closed interval, [w, b], of \mathbb{R}
- In this tutorial, we will focus on this latter, very special but also very important, case

The Mathematical Framework

- ► C ([w, b]): space of continuous functions on [w, b] endowed with the supnorm
- Define V as

$$\{v \in C([w, b]) : v(b) = 1 \text{ and } v \text{ is increasing}\}$$

▶ Define U_{nor} as

$$\{v \in C([w, b]) : v(w) = 0 = v(b) - 1 \text{ and } s. \text{ increasing}\}$$

- ► ca ([w, b]): space of all finite Borel signed measures on [w, b]
- ► ca([w, b]) is the norm dual of C([w, b]). ca([w, b]) is endowed with the weak*-topology
- A is endowed with the relative topology
- ► Fact: ∆ is convex and compact

Preferences

- How do we model the DM's preferences over lotteries?
- A binary relation \succeq on Δ . More formally, a binary relation is a subset of $\Delta \times \Delta$

- $p \succeq q$ is interpreted as "p is weakly better than q"
- > denotes the asymmetric part (Strict Preference)
- $ightarrow \sim$ denotes the symmetric part (Indifference)

Utility Function

Definition

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . $V : \Delta \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function of \succeq if and only if

$$p \succeq q \iff V(p) \ge V(q)$$

- \blacktriangleright We also say that V represents \succeq
- Not each binary relation admits a utility function
- ▶ Notice that if $f: V(\Delta) \to \mathbb{R}$ is strictly increasing than $f \circ V$ also represents \succeq

- **Preorder** \succeq is reflexive and transitive
- Weak Monotonicity For each $x, y \in [w, b]$

$$x \geq y \iff \delta_x \succsim \delta_y$$

 Those are key tenets of rationality for a DM with preferences over monetary lotteries

A Technical Property

- ▶ **Continuity** If $\{p_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, $\{q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subseteq \Delta$, $p_n \succeq q_n$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $p_n \to p$, and $q_n \to q$ then $p \succeq q$
- Intuitively, the DM will not experience a big change in his preferences given some small change in the prospects he is facing

Expected Utility: references

- von Neumann–Morgenstern (1944)
- Nagumo-Kolmogorov-De Finetti (1929, 1930, 1931). See also Hardy-Littlewood-Polya (1934)

Herstein–Milnor (1953)

Expected Utility: the model

- Consider a strictly increasing $v \in C([w, b])$
- Define $U: \Delta \to \mathbb{R}$ by

$$U(p) = \int_{[w,b]} v(x) dp(x) = \mathbb{E}_{p}(v) \qquad \forall p \in \Delta$$

 A DM could rank lotteries according to the criterion U, that is,

$$p \succeq q \stackrel{\text{def}}{\iff} U(p) \ge U(q)$$

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Expected Utility: certainty equivalents

• Define $V : \Delta \rightarrow [w, b]$ by

$$V(p) = v^{-1}(U(p)) = v^{-1}(\mathbb{E}_{p}(v)) \qquad \forall p \in \Delta \quad (1)$$

Notice that $V(\delta_x) = x$ for all $x \in [w, b]$

- Thus, V (p) is the amount of money that, if received with certainty, is equivalent to V (p) under (1)
- It is immediate to see that

$$p \succeq q \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longleftrightarrow} U\left(p\right) \geq U\left(q\right) \Longleftrightarrow V\left(p\right) \geq V\left(q\right)$$

von Neumann-Morgenstern

- ▶ Completeness If $p, q \in \Delta$ then either $p \succeq q$ or $q \succeq p$
- Independence For each $p, q, r \in \Delta$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1]$,

$$p \succeq q \Longrightarrow \lambda p + (1 - \lambda) r \succeq \lambda q + (1 - \lambda) r$$

von Neumann-Morgenstern Representation

Theorem

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . The following statements are equivalent:

- ≿ satisfies Preorder, Completeness, Continuity, Weak Monotonicity, and Independence;
- (ii) there exists a strictly increasing $v \in C([w, b])$ such that

$$p \succeq q \iff \mathbb{E}_{p}(v) \ge \mathbb{E}_{q}(v)$$

Moreover, v is unique up to an affine transformation

Expected Utility: a discussion

- \blacktriangleright If we restrict ourselves to elements of \mathcal{U}_{nor} then we have full fledged uniqueness
- Notice that v is also such that

$$p \succeq q \iff v^{-1}\left(\mathbb{E}_{p}\left(v\right)\right) \ge v^{-1}\left(\mathbb{E}_{q}\left(v\right)\right)$$

Definition

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . \succeq is an Expected Utility (EU) binary relation if and only if it satisfies Preorder, Completeness, Continuity, Weak Monotonicity, and Independence

Risk Attitudes: references

- Pratt (1964)
- Yaari (1969)
- Rothschild–Stiglitz (1970)

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Absolute Risk Attitudes: definitions

▶ For each $p \in \Delta$, e(p) denotes the expected value of p

Definition

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . \succeq is risk averse if and only if $\delta_{e(p)} \succeq p$ for all $p \in \Delta$

Definition

Let \succsim be a binary relation on Δ . \succsim is a mean preserving spread averter if and only if

$$p \succeq_{MPS} q \Longrightarrow p \succeq q$$

Absolute Risk Attitudes: a characterization

Theorem

Let \succeq be an EU binary relation on Δ . The following statements are equivalent:

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- (i) \succeq is risk averse;
- (ii) \succeq is a mean preserving spread averter;
- (iii) v is concave.

Comparative Risk Attitudes

Definition

Let \succeq_1 and \succeq_2 be two binary relations on Δ . \succeq_1 is more risk averse than \succeq_2 if and only if for each $p \in \Delta$ and $x \in [w, b]$

$$p \succeq_1 \delta_x \Longrightarrow p \succeq_2 \delta_x$$

Theorem

Let \gtrsim_1 and \gtrsim_2 be EU binary relations. The following statements are equivalent:

- (i) \succeq_1 is more risk averse than \succeq_2 ;
- (ii) there exists a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave function f such that $v_1 = f \circ v_2$.

Removing Completeness: references

- Aumann (1962)
- Dubra, Maccheroni, Ok (2004)

Baucells and Shapley (2006)

Multi-Expected Utility

Theorem

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . The following statements are equivalent:

- (i) ≿ satisfies Preorder, Continuity, Weak Monotonicity, and Independence;
- (ii) there exists a set, \mathcal{W} , of strictly increasing and continuous functions such that

$$p \succeq q \iff \mathbb{E}_{p}(v) \ge \mathbb{E}_{q}(v) \qquad \forall v \in \mathcal{W}$$

Moreover, \mathcal{W} can be chosen to be a subset of \mathcal{U}_{nor} . In this case, it is unique up to the closed and convex hull.

Multi-Expected Utility: a discussion

 Notice that we could rewrite the aforementioned representation result in the following way

$$p \succeq q \iff v^{-1}\left(\mathbb{E}_{p}\left(v\right)\right) \ge v^{-1}\left(\mathbb{E}_{q}\left(v\right)\right) \qquad \forall v \in \mathcal{W}$$

Definition

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . \succeq is a Multi–Expected Utility (EU) binary relation if and only if it satisfies Preorder, Continuity, Weak Monotonicity, and Independence

Experimental Evidence

- One of the most prominently observed behavior pattern: certainty effect; overvalue risk-free prospects, even in violation of EU
- Allais paradox (common-ratio effect)
 - Choose between:
 - (A) 3000 for sure
 - (B) 4000 with probability 0.8 and 0 with probability 0.2
 - Choose between:
 - ► (C) 3000 with probability 0.25 and 0 with probability 0.75
 - (D) 4000 with probability 0.2 and 0 with probability 0.8
- Majority violate Expected Utility by choosing (A,D) or (B,C)
- Violations are systematic; most of them are of the (A,D) type
- Many more related experiments

Getting Rid of Independence: references

- Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
- Quiggin (1982)
- Machina (1982)
- Fishburn (1983)
- Dekel (1986)
- Becker and Sarin (1987)
- Yaari (1987)
- Chew (1989)
- Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991)

▶ Gul (1991)

A Different Approach: references

- Maccheroni (2002)
- Cerreia–Vioglio (2009)
- Cerreia–Vioglio, Dillenberger, and Ortoleva (2013)
- Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) (under Knightian Uncertainty)
- Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) (under Knightian Uncertainty)

 Cerreia–Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2011) (under Knightian Uncertainty)

Getting Rid of Independence

- For the moment, let us just consider a binary relation that satisfies Preorder, Completeness, Continuity, and Weak Monotonicity
- Can we retrieve a part of this binary relation which is standard, that is, it still satisfies Independence?
- In other words, is the DM an "EU guy" for some of his choices?
- Define a derived binary relation \succeq'

 $p \succeq' q \Longleftrightarrow \lambda p + (1 - \lambda) r \succeq \lambda q + (1 - \lambda) r \quad \forall \lambda \in (0, 1], \forall r \in \Delta$

- $\blacktriangleright \succsim'$ captures the DM ranking for which the DM is sure
- \succeq' is a Multi-EU binary relation

Getting Rid of Independence: the story

The DM is EU... when he is sure of his rankings. Failures of Independence arise in his behavior when forced to choose and he is not definitely sure about p being better than q

Failures of Independence happen in completing preferences

Getting Rid of Independence: a result (Cer '09)

Theorem

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ that satisfies Preorder, Completeness, Continuity, and Weak Monotonicity. The following statements are true:

(a) There exists a convex set $\mathcal{W}' \subseteq \mathcal{U}_{nor}$ such that

$$p \succeq' q \iff \mathbb{E}_{p}(v) \ge \mathbb{E}_{q}(v) \qquad \forall v \in \mathcal{W}';$$

(b) For each $p, q \in \Delta$, if $p \succeq' q$ then $p \succeq q$;

- (c) If \succeq'' is another binary relation that satisfies (a) and (b) then $p \succeq'' q$ then $p \succeq' q$;
- (d) If \succeq'' is another binary relation that satisfies (a) and (b) then $\overline{co}(\mathcal{W}') \subseteq \overline{co}(\mathcal{W}'')$.

Getting Back Some Independence: NCI

► Negative Certainty Independence For each *p*, *q* ∈ Δ, *x* ∈ [*w*, *b*], λ ∈ (0, 1]

$$p \succeq \delta_x \Longrightarrow \lambda p + (1 - \lambda) q \succeq \lambda \delta_x + (1 - \lambda) q$$

- It was first proposed by Dillenberger (2010)
- Let us reread NCI in terms of \succeq' and its interpretation

$$p \succeq \delta_x \Longrightarrow p \succeq' \delta_x$$

In other words,

$$p \not\gtrsim' \delta_x \Longrightarrow \delta_x \succ p$$

- When in doubt, go with certainty!
- Certainty Effect!

Cautious Expected Utility (CDO '13)

Theorem

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . The following statements are equivalent:

- (i) ≿ satisfies Preorder, Completeness, Continuity, Weak Monotonicity, and NCI;
- (ii) There exists a set W of strictly increasing and continuous functions such that $V : \Delta \to \mathbb{R}$, defined by

$$V(p) = \inf_{v \in \mathcal{W}} v^{-1}(\mathbb{E}_{p}(v)) \qquad \forall p \in \Delta,$$

is a continuous utility function for \succeq .

Moreover, W can be chosen to also represent \succeq' (that is, = W'). In this case, it is unique up to the closed convex hull.

Absolute Risk Attitudes: a characterization

Definition

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . \succeq is a Cautious Expected Utility binary relation if and only if it satisfies Preorder, Continuity, Weak Monotonicity, and NCI

Theorem

Let \succeq be a Cautious EU binary relation on Δ . The following statements are equivalent:

- (i) \succeq is a mean preserving spread averter;
- (ii) Each v in \mathcal{W} is concave.

We can also carry a comparative static exercise!

Preference for Randomization

• Mixing For each $p, q \in \Delta$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$

$$p \sim q \Longrightarrow \lambda p + (1 - \lambda) q \succeq p$$

- It is not hard to show that Cautious EU binary relations satisfy Mixing
- If ≿ satisfies Preorder, Completeness, Continuity, and Mixing then for each q ∈ ∆ the set

$$\{p \in \Delta : p \succeq q\}$$

is convex

A Duality Class

Call $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{R} \times \Delta)$ the class of functions $U: \mathbb{R} \times \mathcal{V} \to [-\infty, \infty]$ such that

P.1 For each $v \in \mathcal{V}$ the function $U(\cdot, v) : \mathbb{R} \to [-\infty, \infty]$ is increasing

P.2
$$\lim_{t\to\infty} U(t, v) = \lim_{t\to\infty} U(t, v')$$
 for all $v, v' \in \mathcal{V}$

- P.3 U is \diamond -even quasiconvex
- P.4 U is linearly continuous, that is, the function $V_U: \Delta \to [-\infty, \infty]$, defined by

$$V_{U}\left(p
ight)=\inf_{v\in\mathcal{V}}U\left(\mathbb{E}_{p}\left(v
ight),v
ight)\qquadorall p\in\Delta,$$

is real valued and continuous

A Representation (Cer '09)

Theorem

Let \succeq be a binary relation on Δ . The following statements are equivalent:

- (i) ≿ satisfies Preorder, Completeness, Continuity, Weak Monotonicity, and Mixing;
- (ii) There exists a function U in $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{R} \times \mathcal{V})$ such that

$$p \succsim q \Longleftrightarrow \inf_{v \in \mathcal{V}} U\left(\mathbb{E}_{p}\left(v\right), v\right) \geq \inf_{v \in \mathcal{V}} U\left(\mathbb{E}_{q}\left(v\right), v\right)$$

 U can be proven to be "essentially" unique and also an index of risk aversion (comparative statics is possible)

Particular Cases

Cautious EU binary relations

$$U\left(t,v
ight)=\left\{egin{array}{cc} v^{-1}\left(t
ight) & v\in\mathcal{W}\ \infty & otherwise \end{array}
ight. orall \left(t,v
ight)\in\mathbb{R} imes\Delta
ight.$$

Maccheroni's binary relations

$$U(t, v) = \left\{egin{array}{cc} t & v \in \mathcal{W} \ \infty & otherwise \end{array}
ight. orall t(t, v) \in \mathbb{R} imes \Delta$$

Conclusions

- There are several experimental studies providing evidence for the violation of the axiom of Independence
- There are also several models out there that address this issue
- DMO '13 offer as motivation the Certainty Effect (Negative Certainty Independence)
- One read of this model: a procedure of cautious extension of incomplete preferences
- Certainty Effect implies a preference for hedging (Mixing/Preference for Randomization)
- Mixing yields a generalized version of the pessimistic criterion characterized in DMO '13 under the same interpretation (see Cer '09)

A Message

 Decision Theory is fun! Often, in answering relevant Economics questions, it forces you to solve nontrivial mathematical problems!

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Preorder: a discussion

- Reflexive $p \succeq p$ for all $p \in \Delta$
- Transitive If $p \succeq q$ and $q \succeq r$ then $p \succeq r$

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Preorder

Uniqueness

- \blacktriangleright Assume v_1 and v_2 "both represent" \succeq
- There exists $\alpha > 0$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$v_1 = \alpha v_2 + \beta$$

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vNM's Theorem

A Problem of Choice under Risk



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Risk Aversion

A Problem of Choice under Risk

 \blacktriangleright Assume \mathcal{W}_1 and \mathcal{W}_2 "both represent" \succsim

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 $\blacktriangleright \ \bar{\operatorname{co}}\left(\mathcal{W}_{1}\right) = \bar{\operatorname{co}}\left(\mathcal{W}_{2}\right)$

Multi-Expected Utility

Sketch of the Proof

1. Define the Aumann cone

$$\mathcal{C}\left(\succsim
ight)=\left\{ \lambda\left(p-q
ight) :\lambda>0 ext{ and }p\succsim q
ight\}$$

- 2. Prove it is indeed a weak* closed and convex cone (non trivial use of Banach-Steinhaus and Krein-Smulian theorems)
- 3. Compute the polar cone

$$\mathcal{W} = \left\{ v \in C\left([w, b] \right) : \int_{[w, b]} v\left(x \right) dr \le 0 \text{ for all } r \in C\left(\succsim \right) \right\}$$

4. By an application of the Hahn-Banach Theorem and point 2, it follows that ${\cal W}$ is the set that does the job

Multi-Expected Utility