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Geometry and Logic. The Shape of Mathematical Proof from Antiquity to the Early Modern Age

Divide et inveni: the role of geometrical practice in Aristotle’s explanation of knowing

speaker: Monica Ugaglia (Università di Udine)

abstract: It is undeniable that, as a phisicist, and more general as a philosopher, Aristotle does not (and cannot) use mathematics as an instrument of proof. In fact, he uses it in very limited measure and confines it to aspects that are not essential to the knowledge. It is equally true, though less evident, that he makes a pervasive and subtle use of it in a different form: not as instrument, but as model, in the sense of analogy. This is quite well known on a global level, mathematics serving Aristotle as a paradigmatic example of demonstrative science, in the sense of a system of knowledge, so that he attempts to construct all other scientific disciplines in an analogous way. It is perhaps less well known that the same procedure of analogy is used by Aristotle at a local level as well, in the solution of problems and the construction of explanations and definitions, in the course of all his preliminary research work. This recourse to mathematics is situated on a quite different plane, at once more elementary and more latent than is commonly believed, and implies the attribution to Aristotle of a sound mathematical experience: the philosopher Aristotle knows mathematics quite well as a deductive construction, but is also quite familiar in its practice, that is, with the mathematician’s daily work. In particular, I am here interested on the question of the visual and mental perception that he recognises as central to the mathematician’s way of proceeding. Not during the final phase of the organising of knowledge, but in the preliminary phase of investigation, or solution of individual problems.


timetable:
Mon 17 Jun, 14:15 - 15:45, Sala Stemmi
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